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Abstract
A set of agents is connected by two distinct networks, with each network
describing access to a different local public good. Agents choose which
networks to invest in, and neighbouring agents’ investments in the same good
are strategic substitutes, as are an agent’s two investment choices. There
are always equilibria where any investing agent bears all local investment
costs and others free-ride. When investment in one good reduces marginal
benefit from investment in the other, agents free-riding in one good may
invest more profitably in the other, and equilibrium payoffs are more evenly
distributed. This need not reduce aggregate payoff. (Keywords: Multi-layer
networks, network games, public goods. JEL: D85, C72, H41)
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1 Introduction
At work, school, or in our communities, we will often have opportunity to share
the work of others for our own benefit. We get to enjoy the sights and smells
when our neighbours plant their gardens, and just one co-author’s brilliant insight
may be enough to push a group project forward. These are instances of non-
excludable local public goods, where individual contributions are shared by anyone
with access to them. Our research is inspired by the example of research and
development between firms. Firms may invest to innovate new technologies, but
technological breakthroughs may quickly be adopted by other firms, and firms may
be incentivised to withhold investment in the hope that others will innovate first.
Firms may have multiple research opportunities and limited resources, and
maximising profit requires allocating these resources to where they are most ef-
ficient. In our model, return on investment has two factors: declining returns
when multiple connected firms research the same technology, and increased costs
when a firm spreads its resources widely across many technologies. Our work an-
swers questions as to how firms, or any agents in networks, will best allocate their
resources between networks.
Because firms have research links in multiple technologies, there are multiple
overlapping networks in which they connect, and actions in each network are stra-
tegically determined by the linking structure and the investments of other firms
in all networks. Multiple networks may be used to model many situations; for in-
stance, as individuals we have networks of friends and networks of colleagues, with
each relationship providing a different set of costs and rewards. Nearly all prior
network literature involves agents in a single network; thus, we believe research
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connecting strategic decision making in multiple networks is novel, and will help
to open new ways of thinking about how agents connect.
There is one set of agents with two public goods to invest in. Each good has a
distinct set of connections describing the pairs of agents who share benefits, and
benefits for any agent depend solely upon the total investment of all agents they
share links with in a good. Because of the cost of investing, an agent will always
prefer a neighbour’s investment to an equal amount of their own investment. Firms
will, when possible, seek to avoid investment when their neighbours are willing to
bear the cost of investing instead.
Agents who make the choice to invest in both goods face an increased marginal
cost relative to their investment in each good. This effect is labelled distraction,
and measures inefficiency from spreading research efforts too widely. As distraction
increases, firms are more heavily penalised for investing in both goods, which will
incentivise them to select one good for investment. When there is no distraction,
the investment decisions for each good are independent, and the model nests the
work of Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007).
Because marginal benefit decreases when neighbours invest, two linked agents
are strategic substitutes. As well, because distraction decreases investment payoffs,
an agent’s two investments are strategic substitutes. We show how each of these
factors affects equilibrium, and prove the existence in any network of equilibria
where any investing agent receives no investment help from her neighbours.
Welfare is measured according to two factors: aggregate payoff and the distribu-
tion of payoffs. Owing to each agent’s self-interested decision making, investment
will always be less than an aggregate payoff maximising level, as the externalities
from investment are always positive. We discuss how an agent’s neighbours affect
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his choice of which good to invest in, which can factor into an agent selecting
the wrong investment good with respect to aggregate welfare. We establish that
agents who invest in both goods will always be the least well-off agents in any
equilibrium.
Increasing the cost of investment will decrease the payoff generated by any
agent who invests in both layers, when holding the investments of all agents fixed.
However, strategic implications when agents act in response to an increase in
distraction may provide benefit to these investors. As making two investments
becomes unprofitable, investors are forced to choose a single good for investment.
This raises minimum payoffs in a network, as dual-investors fair worst, and, so
long as there are other investors to replace the lost investment, the efficiency of
investments can rise. Adding links is often beneficial for aggregate payoff, as new
links spread investment benefits, but some links may reduce aggregate payoff if
they connect investors who respond by lowering their investments.
For an equilibrium to be stable—when a sequence of myopic best responses
by all agents to a small perturbation of equilibrium converges to the original
equilibrium—requires additional constraints on the connections of any non-
investing agent. As well, these constraints are more strict when a non-investing
agent is only linked to investors who invest in both goods. This leads to the
conclusion that the subset of equilibria that are stable will be the most equitable
equilibria, as they will contain a higher proportion of investors in one good versus
those who invest in none or both.
We discuss an adaption of the model that, while simplifying payoff structure,
allows for a much broader set of strategic interactions. On each layer, actions
between agents may be strategic complements or substitutes, and this flexibility
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applies also to the relationship between an agent’s two actions. In this simplified
extension, we show the parameter space on which a unique equilibrium exists.
This chapter contributes to an extensive literature on public good investment,
where public goods are generally undersupplied by voluntary contributions. Warr
(1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that aggregate contribution and individual
consumption are invariant to transfers between contributing agents, provided that
transfers leave all contributing agents above their original level of private consump-
tion. Network models allow for local public goods, where benefits are shared only
by agents connected to contributors (e.g. Allouch 2013; Allouch 2015; Bramoulle´
and Kranton 2007). Elliott and Golub’s (2019) model has one universal public
good and a weighted network describing heterogeneous inter-agent benefits from
contribution. Foster and Rosenweig (1995) empirically show that knowledge does
spread through a network, but more slowly than it may if individuals were con-
sidering their neighbours. In contrast to these models, our model is novel because
it has two public goods on two networks; each good is underinvested in, and an
agent’s choice of good may have positive or negative externalities for neighbours.
We contribute to the study of strategic decision-making in networks. In these
games, the connections between agents determine the strategic effects that their
actions have on each other. The following surveys: Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2016)
and Jackson and Zenou (2015), and books: Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008),
provide a starting point for this literature. Linear quadratic payoff models are
highly flexible, allowing for a wide range of strategic effects through the adjust-
ment of a single parameter (e.g. Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol et al. 2006; Ballester,
Zenou et al. 2010; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou 2004). Bramoulle´, Kranton and
D’Amours’s (2014) generic model nests many of these games, and they analyse
5
what drives games of strategic substitutes to have corner solutions and multiple
equilibria. Galeotti et al. (2010) find that when agents in games of strategic sub-
stitutes have incomplete network information and act upon their expected location
in a network, unique equilibria exist. By connecting two networks in our model,
we show that the outcome in one network determines the set of potential outcomes
in the other.
Our model helps to explain a problem of allocating resources in a network.
When agents have a fixed budget to invest they are unable to invest in all profitable
opportunities and must find the set of investments that is most efficient (e.g.
Baumann 2015; Bloch and Dutta 2009; Salonen 2014). In contrast, in our model
an agent’s budget is unconstrained, but the choice of taking multiple investments
makes each investment less profitable. Thus, a profit optimising agent may be
forced to choose between two network actions that are independently profitable
because they are strategic substitutes.
We contribute to the understanding of how network links may create or rein-
force inequality. Dalton (1920) and Atkinson (1970) explore which measures of
dispersion in a population best capture inequality. In Gagnon and Goyal’s (2017)
model, agents have a network action and a market action. Taking the market
action changes the network payoffs, and when poorer agents in the network re-
ceive greater benefit from the network action inequality falls. In our model, both
actions are network actions, but costly actions in one network provide benefits in
the other, which can reduce inequality.
Our model provides insight into the costs, benefits and strategies induced by
R&D networks. In some models (e.g. Goyal, Konovalov et al. 2008; Goyal and
Moraga-Gonza´lez 2001) cost reduction is greatest when firms cooperate, and prior
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to market competition research spending is complementary. In Westbrock (2010),
links provide fixed R&D benefits. Our model follows most closely the assumptions
of Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), that one firm’s research may substitute for
another firm’s research, and because firms do not consider the benefits they provide
to their neighbours they will invest below a level that is efficient.
This chapter contributes a new model of multi-layer networks. There are few
existing papers where agents interact concurrently in multiple networks. Ko¨nig
et al. (2014) model firms who compete in local markets after making cost-reducing
investments in R&D networks. The price determining markets are modelled as
overlapping coalitions. Chen et al. (2018) focus primarily on a single layer model,
but they provide an extension where agents are connected in two networks with
an action on each network, where strategic network effects are complements. Joshi
et al. (2019) have a model where agents begin in a fixed network. They then form
links to create a second network, where the benefits from network positioning are
jointly derived from the two networks. Excluding our own model, we are not aware
of any multi-layer models where inter-agent actions on both layers may be strategic
substitutes.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
provides analysis of equilibrium, welfare properties, comparative statics, and stable
equilibrium. Section 4 includes further discussion of the model and its implica-
tions. Section 5 discusses potential extensions. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
provided in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
There are n agents, each existing in the set N = {1, . . . , n}. These agents have the
opportunity to invest effort in two non-excludable, local public goods, good 1 and
good 2. Each public good has a distinct set of links that describe pairs of agents
who share the benefits of public good investment. The set of links for good p is gp,
∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, which contains a binary element gpij for each pair of agents i, j ∈ N .
If a link exists in good p between i and j then gpij = 1, otherwise g
p
ij = 0. Each
set of links will be referred to as a separate layer of the network. Each layer is
undirected, meaning that a link between agents i and j in layer p is a link between
j and i, and gpij = g
p
ji ∀ i, j ∈ N, ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}. As well, we assume that an agent
does not link to herself, implying gpii = 0 ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}. In g + gpij, gpij = 1
and all other links are as in g. Similarly, in g − gpij, gpij = 0 and all other links are
as in g. The matrix whose i, jth element is gpij will be denoted G
p.
In the layer gp, any agent sharing a link with agent i is connected to i in gp,
and the set of all agents connected to agent i are i’s neighbours in gp, denoted
Ni(g
p) = {j ∈ N | gpij = 1}. i′s neighbourhood in gp is the union of i′s neighbours
and i. i’s cardinality in gp is the the number of neighbours that agent i has in g
p,
denoted ηpi =
∣∣Ni(gp)∣∣. An agent with no neighbours in gp is considered to be in
autarky.
Agents choose to invest in neither, one, or both of the public goods. An agent
i’s investment is si = (s
1
i , s
2
i ) ∈ S, where S is a convex subset of R2+ that includes
the investment (0, 0). The profile of all investments in the network is the two-
dimensional vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn.
In each layer, the network structure and action set are consistent with many
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existing network games. While there are a small number of models addressed in
Section 1 that include aspects of two networks, our model is the only model we
are aware of that combines two actions on two separate layers into a multi-layer
network with a single payoff function.
The payoff of any agent is defined by the following function:
Πi(s | g) = f
s1i + ∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1j
− cs1i + f
s2i + ∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2j
− cs2i − βs1i s2i . (1)
The benefit function f is twice-differentiable and strictly concave, with f(0) = 0,
f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) < 0, and f ′(0) > c. Because f is the same in both layers, com-
parative analysis is restricted to differences in the linking structure between the
two layers. However, extending the model to allow for different benefit functions
is straightforward and many of the conclusions persist. c > 0 is a fixed cost of
investment that is constant across both layers.
The term βs1i s
2
i incorporates the cost of investing in two layers simultaneously.
The marginal cost of investing in one layer for any agent i increases with their in-
vestment in the other layer. In a research context, this may represent an increased
cost to a firm of spreading their efforts across multiple technologies. In keeping
with this example, we will refer to β as a measure of distraction. As β increases,
the cost of spreading effort across both layers increases as well. We assume that
β ≥ 0.
This cost term has some convenient properties. First, when β = 0, cost is
additively separable into cs1i + cs
2
i , and decisions in one layer are independent from
actions in the other. Second, when sqi = 0, cost in layer g
p, cspi , is independent of
β—when an agent only invests in one of the two layers, their investment decision
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is independent of β.
Because an agent’s investment provides benefit to all of his neighbours, this is
a game of positive externalities. As well, if agent i makes an investment in layer
gp, and i and j are neighbours in gp, then j’s marginal benefit from investment in
gp will fall. Thus, for neighbours in layer gp, investments in gp are strategic sub-
stitutes. Because an agent’s decision to invest in one layer increases the marginal
cost for that agent of investment in the other, an agent’s two investment opportun-
ities are strategic substitutes for one another. To distinguish between these two
different strategic effects, we refer to the investments of two agents connected in a
layer as inter-agent strategic substitutes, whereas a single agent’s two investments
are intra-agent strategic substitutes.
The degree of substitution between an agent’s two investments increases with
β. When β = 0, the two layers are disjoint, equilibrium decisions in one layer are
independent of equilibrium decisions in the other layer. As β →∞, agents will
be unable to invest in both layers, and each agent must choose at most one layer
to invest in. On intermediate values of β, agents may select investment in both
layers, but the additional costs from the substitution effect of β may make them
less likely to do so.
3 Analysis
Our model gives rise to four main questions: First, does equilibrium exist, and
can we characterise the behaviour of all agents in equilibrium? Second, what
are the welfare properties in equilibrium, measured both by aggregate payoff and
the distribution of payoffs in the population? Third, how do equilibrium and
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welfare change with the model’s parameters, specifically distraction and the linking
structure? Finally, under what conditions do stable equilibria exist, and what are
the welfare properties of stable equilibria?
As we have highlighted, when β = 0, an agent’s two investment choices are
independent, and the problem of maximising payoff for any agent is separable into
maximising payoff on each layer. Thus, by setting β = 0, our model nests a base
case presented by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007). We will provide comparison of
our new results to this base case, but will not repeat their results in this chapter.
3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile s∗ is a
Nash equilibrium if, for any agent i, strategy s∗i is a strategy that maximises i’s
payoff, given all other agents invest according to s∗. More formally, s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if
Πi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i | g) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i | g), ∀ si ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ N. (2)
where s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) denotes the profile of investments by all
agents excluding i.
We divide agents in equilibrium into three types: an agent who invests in both
layers is a dual-actor, an agent who invests in only one layer is a single-actor,
and an agent who does not invest at all is a free-rider. As well, an investor may
be classified as a specialist if they are providing all of the investment in their
neighbourhood, or as an intermediate investor if they are investing along with one
or more neighbours. An equilibrium is specialised if all investors are specialists,
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distributed if there are no specialists, and a hybrid if it does not conform to either
preceding category.
While S may be unbounded, for analysis we need only consider the feasible
action space, S˜, defined to be the set of all si ∈ S that may be optimal for an
agent i—meaning that for some network (N, g) and set of actions s−i, si may
maximise i’s payoff. The concavity of f ensures that S˜ is a compact subset of S.
On this set, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i ) > β
2 ∀ si ∈ S˜
Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the payoff function Πi(s | g) is
always concave on S˜. This, in turn, is used to show that any agent’s optimal
action on any network is uniquely determined by the actions of all other agents.
We begin with the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Existence). Assume that Assumption 1 holds. On any network (N, g)
there exists a specialist Nash equilibrium.
The importance of specialist equilibria is reinforced in Section 3.4, where we
discuss stable equilibria—equilibria for which a series of myopic best responses to
a sufficiently small perturbation will converge on the original equilibria. There, we
will show that stable equilibria must be specialist equilibria.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a complete characterisation of how all agents
must act in equilibrium, which follows in Section 3.1.2. We prove the existence of
equilibrium on any network with n = 2 then proceed inductively. For any network
(N, g), we select an arbitrary agent k, and assume the existence of a specialised
equilibrium on the reduced network (N \ k, g). First, we determine when k’s best-
response action to the actions of the other agents does not force any of the other
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Figure 1: The set S˜, for f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), c = 1, and β = 1
2
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agents to change their action. Next, where this is not the case, we construct a
finite sequence of action changes that must terminate in a specialised equilibrium.
3.1.1 The feasible set: S˜
An agent i acting in a single-layer network will have a profitable investment op-
portunity if their local investment, the sum of all of their neighbour’s investments,
is less than sˆs, where sˆs is the unique solution to f
′(sˆs) = c (see Bramoulle´ and
Kranton 2007). i’s investment is si = sˆs − s¯i, with s¯i =
∑
j∈Ni(g) sj. We extend
this to a two-layer case by letting s¯pi =
∑
j∈Ni(gp) s
p
j ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, and conclude that
an agent i will never invest in either layer if s¯pi ≥ sˆs ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}.
When s¯pi < sˆs and s¯
q
i ≥ sˆs, then i’s actions are relatively straightforward. i will
invest only in layer gp, making investment si = {sˆs − s¯pi , 0}.
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When both s¯pi < sˆs and s¯
q
i < sˆs, for p 6= q, then i’s decision is more complex.
The marginal benefit of an investment of spi is
∂Πi(s|g)
∂spi
= f ′(spi + s¯
p
i )− c− βsqi .
Therefore, for any agent i in equilibrium, it must always be the case that
f ′(s1i + s¯
1
i )− βs2i − c ≤ 0 and (3)
f ′(s2i + s¯
2
i )− βs1i − c ≤ 0. (4)
Otherwise, agent i would increase investment in any layer where marginal payoff
is positive. Further, we may assume that Equations (3) and (4) hold with strict
equality whenever i makes positive investments in layers g1 or g2, respectively,
and thus both equations must hold with strict equality in the case of an interior
solution—when i is a dual-actor. Assumption 1 guarantees that the boundaries of
inequalities (3) and (4) will intersect at most once. The feasible set, S˜, is the set
constrained by inequalities (3) and (4) along with s1i ≤ sˆs and s2i ≤ sˆs, as shown
in Figure 1.
3.1.2 Characterisation of equilibrium
To fully describe the equilibrium actions of a single agent, we take an arbitrary
agent i in a network (N, g) and let p ∈ {1, 2} be the layer in which local invest-
ment for agent i is weakly lesser, and q the other layer. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Let i be an agent in the network (N, g), and let s¯pi ≤ s¯qi for
p, q ∈ {1, 2}, p 6= q. Assume that Assumption 1 holds. The following four con-
ditions must all be met in equilibrium:
1. If s¯pi ≥ sˆs, then i will be a free-rider and make investment si = (0, 0).
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2. If s¯pi < sˆs and sˆs − s¯pi ≥ f
′(s¯qi )−c
β
, then i will be a single-actor and make in-
vestments spi = sˆs − s¯pi and sqi = 0.
3. If s¯pi = s¯
q
i < sˆs, then i will make investment si = (s˜i, s˜i), where
f ′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
4. Otherwise, i’s unique optimal investment must involve investment in both
layers.
Using Proposition 1 we may classify how any agent must act in a special-
ised equilibrium. Any free-rider will invest (0, 0), and must have local investment
weakly greater than sˆs in each layer. A single-actor will invest sˆs in the layer in
which no neighbours are investing, and must be connected to at least one invest-
ing agent in the other layer. Finally, if an agent is connected to no investors in
either layer then they must be a dual-actor, making investment (sˆd, sˆd), where
f ′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
3.2 Welfare properties
The first measure of welfare we will use is the aggregate payoff of all agents, which
is defined as
W (s | g) =
∑
i∈N
[
f
(
s1i + s¯
1
i
)− cs1i + f (s2i + s¯2i )− cs2i − βs1i s2i ] (5)
An equilibrium profile s is efficient if there is no other action profile that strictly
increases welfare. That is, there is no s′ ∈ Sn such that W (s′ | g) > W (s | g). As
well, we will analyse the distribution of payoffs within a population, under the
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assumption that a narrower distribution is more equitable. A key measure we will
use is the minimal payoff to any agent in equilibrium.
First, we consider aggregate payoffs in a network, and determine how equilib-
rium decisions relate to efficiency. There are two elements of an individual agent’s
self-interested decision making that may create a divergence from efficient out-
comes. The first, where an agent underinvests relative to an efficient level in each
layer, parallels the discussion of disjoint layers. The second relates to an agent’s
layer choice, and how this affects other agents.
Within each layer, all agents in an efficient profile who are making a positive
investment must invest such that ∂W (s|g)
∂spi
= 0, which implies that
f ′
(
spi + s¯
p
i
)− βsqi + ∑
j∈Ni(gp)
f ′
(
spj + s¯
p
j
)
− c = 0. (6)
where gp is the layer in which i is investing and gq is the other layer. However, in
equilibrium, f ′
(
spi + s¯
p
i
)− βsqi − c = 0 for any i investing in layer gp, and because
f ′(·) > 0, the term ∑j∈Ni(gp) f ′ (spj + s¯pj) must be strictly positive. This guaran-
tees that any agent who invests in equilibrium will always underinvest relative to
an efficient level.
In any layer of a specialised equilibrium, only non-investors may have links to
investing agents, meaning the payoffs for single-actors and dual-actors are fixed.
From each layer, a dual-actor will receive payoff f(sˆd)− csˆd − 12βsˆ2d. A single-actor
receives f(sˆs)− csˆs from the layer in which they are investing, and at least f(sˆd)
from the other layer. A free-rider must have local investment of at least sˆs in each
layer, otherwise they would invest themselves, which ensures that the payoff that
a free-rider receives from each layer is at least f(sˆs). This leads to the following
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proposition.
Proposition 2. In any specialist equilibrium on the network (N, g), all dual-actors
will receive payoff less than that of any other agent.
In Section 3.3 we examine the parameter values for which dual-actors may exist
in equilibrium, concluding that parameterisations that exclude dual-actors will in
turn prevent the most unequal equilibria from occurring.
3.3 Comparative statics
We compare the strategic implications and welfare effects of changing two vari-
ables, β and g. This is measured according to second-best equilibrium profiles; an
equilibrium s∗ is second-best if and only if there is no other equilibrium s∗′ such
that W (s∗′ | g) > W (s∗ | g).
As β increases, it has multiple effects on an agent’s ability to profitably invest
in both layers concurrently. Directly, β affects the benefit from an agent’s invest-
ments, so when β rises an agent investing in both goods will see their absolute and
marginal costs increase. Holding actions constant, any agent investing in both
goods will have a strictly lower payoff.
A secondary effect of an increase in β is that it expands the opportunity for
agents contributing in one layer to avoid contribution in the other layer. For an
agent i who makes an investment in layer gp to not invest in gq, his local investment
in gq, s¯qi , must be sufficiently high that marginal return from any new investment
will not exceed marginal costs, as is set out in Lemma 3. When β increases, these
marginal costs will increase, and the threshold level of local investment required
to sustain a non-investment for i in gq falls, expanding i’s ability to free-ride in
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Figure 2: Benefit from investment
sˆss˜
slope = c
slope = c+  spi
f(s˜)
f(sˆs)
cs
f(s)
s
that layer.
Figure 2 illustrates this effect. We assume that for some agent i, s¯pi < s¯
q
i , thus
if i’s equilibrium investment is in a single layer i’s investment will be spi = sˆs − s¯pi
in layer gp. Then the optimal local investment for i in layer gq is s˜, where
f ′(s˜) = c+ βspi . For any level of local investment above s˜, i will not invest in
layer gq in equilibrium, whereas if local investment is below s˜ then i must be a
dual-actor, as set out in Proposition 1, statement 2. As β increases, s˜ decreases,
which increases the range of local investment in layer gq for which i’s equilibrium
action is to invest in a single layer.
If s∗ is a second-best equilibrium profile on the network (N, g), then the ad-
dition of the link gpij may have three effects. If both s
p
i
∗ = 0 and spj
∗ = 0 then
W (s∗ | g + gpij) = W (s∗ | g). s∗ is still an equilibrium profile which yields the same
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welfare, and there may be another equilibrium profile where either or both of
spi > 0 and s
p
j > 0 which yields higher welfare. If either s
p
i
∗ > 0 or spj
∗ > 0, then
W (s∗ | g + gpij) > W (s∗ | g). s∗ remains an equilibrium profile, and the new link
passes additional benefit to a new node, thus second-best equilibrium in the new
network must be strictly higher.
The final effect is where partial substitutes differ most from the case of disjoint
layers. Suppose that both spi
∗ > 0 and spj
∗ > 0. Then, s∗ is no longer an equilibrium
in the network (N, g + gpij), and second-best welfare may increase or decrease.
Holding initial investments constant, after i and j are linked in layer gp, benefits
will increase for both agents while costs will remain constant. However, because
marginal benefit in layer gp will decrease for both agents, it will no longer be an
equilibrium and at least one of the agents will decrease their investment. Knock
on effects will be multiple, supposing agent j reduces spj , j’s marginal cost in layer
gq, c+ βspj , will fall, and j may also increase sjq in equilibria. As well, the initial
decreases in spj will result in the marginal benefit increasing for all k ∈ Nj(gp),
and these agents may then increase their investment in gp. As these actions may
effect aggregate payoff both positively or negatively, the effect of the new link gpij
is indeterminate.
The following examples shows both consequences of an additional link.
Example 1 (Negative Effect). Consider the three-agent networks in Figure 3. We
continue to use the model with f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), β = 1
2
, and c = 1. The initial
network is shown in Figure 3a, along with each agent’s investment in the second-
best equilibrium, for which aggregate payoff is approximately 5.318. Note that in
g1 all investment borne by the most central agent, 1, leading to the second-best
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Figure 3: New link with a negative effect
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Figure 4: New link with a positive effect
(a) Before
0 0 1 1
g1 g2
1 1
2 2 33
0.56 0.56
(b) After
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g1 g2
1 1
2 2 33
equilibrium for that layer independently.
In Figure 3b, a link has been added between agents 2 and 3 in layer g2. While
both agents had been investing before in Figure 3a, due to the new link they must
in aggregate invest less in g2. This, in turn, prevents agent 1 from free-riding
in g2, and 1 can’t bear all of the investment in g1. In the second-best equilibrium,
which is shown in Figure 3b, the new link in layer g2 results in a considerably worse
aggregate outcome in layer g1, and the total aggregate payoff is approximately 5.037.
Aggregate payoff in the second-best equilibrium has fallen by about 0.2808.
Example 2 (Positive Effect). Consider the three-agent networks in Figure 4, and
the model with f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), β = 1
2
, and c = 1. The initial network is shown
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in Figure 4a, along with each agent’s investment in the second-best equilibrium,
which has aggregate payoff of approximately 3.057. Because there are no links in
layer g2, all agents must invest in this layer in any equilibrium, and they are less
able to invest in layer g1 where any investment is shared.
In Figure 4, a link has been added between agents 1 and 2 in layer g2. Then,
agents 1 and 2 must reduce their aggregate investment in g2, which will benefit both
agents. In the second-best equilibrium shown, agent 1 can free-ride off of agent 2’s
investment in g2, freeing up agent 1 to invest a greater amount in layer g1 to the
benefit of all agents. Aggregate payoff is approximately 5.318, and the improvement
in the aggregate payoff in second-best equilibrium is approximately 2.261.
3.4 Stability of equilibrium
An equilibrium is stable if, after a sufficiently small perturbation of the equilibrium
investment profile, a series of myopic best responses by each agent will converge
back to equilibrium. Agent i’s best response to the profile of all other agents’
investments is defined
ri(s−i | g) = arg max
si
{Πi(si, s−i | g)}. (7)
The profile of all agents’ best responses is determined by r(s | g) : Sn → Sn. Define
the series rt(s | g) = r(rt−1(s | g) | g) with r0(s | g) = s. Then, the equilibrium s∗
is stable if there exists some ρ > 0 such that, for any  ∈ Rn×2+ with
∣∣pi ∣∣ < ρ and
spi
∗ + pi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, limt→∞ rt(s∗ + ) = s∗.
Let s∗ be an equilibrium, and suppose i is an intermediate investor in layer
gp. Then if i’s neighbour in gp increases his investment, i’s best response may
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either be to decrease his investment in g1 or to change his layer choice. When
a permutation of equilibrium is such that investments all weakly increase in one
layer, in the first step of myopic best responses all investments in the same layer
will be weakly lower, while all investments in the opposite layer will be weakly
higher. In every step, this pattern will reverse, and this oscillating pattern is
key in demonstrating that any equilibrium with intermediate investments may be
permuted in such a manner that they never converge to the original equilibrium,
ensuring a stable equilibrium must be specialised. This is essential in proving the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume Assumption 1 holds. An equilibrium is stable if and only if
the set of agents N can be partitioned into four disjoint sets, L, I1, I2, and D,
where
1. ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, D ∪ Ip is a maximal independent set in layer gp, and
2. ∀ ` ∈ L and ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, ` is linked in layer gp to either
(a) more than sˆs
sˆd
agents in set D, or
(b) at least one agent in Ip and more than one agent in D ∪ Ip,
and the actions of all agents are as follows: sd = (sˆd, sˆd) ∀ d ∈ D,
si1 = (sˆs, 0) ∀ i1 ∈ I1, si2 = (0, sˆs) ∀ i2 ∈ I2, and s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L.
As the value of β increases, sˆd decreases becauese f
′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0. With
sˆs fixed, the ratio
sˆs
sˆd
then increases as β increases. As a result, as the value of β
rises, Theorem 2 condition 2a indicates that, if a free-rider is not free-riding from
at least one single-actor, the number of dual-actors they must be connected to will
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Figure 5: Stable Equilibria
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rise. Ultimately, distraction may have two effects on stable equilibria, the payoff
for dual-actors and their neighbours will fall as the level of distraction rises, when
actions remain constant, but a higher level of distraction may preclude equilibria
that feature agents free-riding off of dual-actors, which will increase equity and
may increase aggregate payoff, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3. Let n = 4, f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) and c = 1, so that
Πi(s | g) = 2 log
s1i + ∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1j + 1
− s1i
+ 2 log
s2i + ∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2j + 1
− s2i − βs1i s2i , (8)
and assume that the network is a star in each layer, with the same central agent
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in both layers. Then sˆs = 1 and sˆd =
√
1+6β+β2−(1+β)
2β
, which is decreasing in β.
When β = 0, the only stable equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5a. In this equi-
librium, the central agent receives Π1 ≈ 5.54, the peripheral agents (agents 2–
4) receive Π−1 ≈ 0.77, and aggregate payoff is W ≈ 7.86. Figure 5b depicts the
equivalent stable equilibrium when β is less than 3
2
. Now Π1 = 4 log(3sˆd + 1) and
Π−1 = 4 log(sˆd + 1)− 2sˆd. As there is no change in strategy apart from reducing
investment, distraction makes all agents worse off. However, for values of β above
this range, equilibrium 5b cannot persist, as the central agent’s local investment
is insufficient to support free-riding. Then, the equilibrium in Figure 5c, which is
stable for all β > 0, is the only stable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, Π1 ≈ 3.16,
Π−1 ≈ 1.77, and W ≈ 8.48. Because distraction forces agents into a different set of
investments versus when layers are disjoint, distraction increases aggregate payoff
and the distribution of payoffs is more equitable.
4 Discussion
In each layer, agents who contribute receive lower payoffs than those who do not,
which is why dual-actors must be the least well off of all agents. Holding in-
vestments fixed, increasing distraction will penalise dual-actors further. However,
we’ve shown that, as distraction increases, the minimal payoff for any agent in a
network will eventually become higher when dual-action becomes unsustainable.
In essence, being the lowliest agent becomes so unpalatable that these agents are
forced to stop allowing their neighbours to profit at their expense in both layers,
and where possible, other agents will take their place and become investors.
When distraction rises, dual-actors gain a comparative strategic advantage
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over their free-riding neighbours. Because a dual-actor is distracted, the marginal
benefit they receive from investing is lower. When agents have different marginal
benefits in one layer, the game becomes similar in character to Allouch’s (2015)
local public good game with heterogeneous wealth. There, wealthier agents have
greater marginal benefit from public investment, and in each local neighbourhood
the wealthiest agents invest to the benefit of their poorer neighbours. In our
model, after fixing the investments of all agents in one layer, agents will have
heterogeneous payoff functions from investment in the other layer.
Gagnon and Goyal’s (2017) model provides similar lessons in comparative ad-
vantages within networks. Agents have a binary market action that provides a
fixed payoff to all, and a binary network action with increasing benefit as the
number of neighbours taking this action rises. In the case of strategic substitutes,
taking the market action reduces the rate at which network benefits increase. In
this case, highly connected agents who are connected primarily to highly connected
agents, those who are benefitting most from the network action, may choose not
to take the market action as it will reduce their network benefits. Less connected
agents will have less to lose and will select the market action, and thus the market
action serves to decrease inequality. In our model, the connected actions are both
network actions, but benefitting from one action (or non-action) may still create
disadvantages in the other network, leading to similar effects.
5 Extensions
Because strategic network effects are substitutes, actions tend to separate. As
more agents invest in one layer, the marginal payoff to any agent investing in that
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layer weakly decreases. This, in effect, limits the amount of investment that any
layer will receive. In contrast, some networks may feature complementary network
effects. Then, as more agents invest in a layer, marginal payoff to agents investing
in that layer will weakly increase, which may further draw agents to invest in that
layer. We could see a pooling effect, as agents might coordinate and only invest in
complementary layers when a sufficient number of their neighbours are doing so
as well.
To allow for a more robust set of potential inter- and intra-agent interactions,
we must find a simpler model. Chen et al. (2018) model socially connected crimin-
als who engage in a second network activity, and we use their model as a starting
point. Here, an agent’s payoff is modelled according to the payoff function
Πi(s | g) = α1s1i +α2s2i−
[
1
2
(
s1i
)2
+
1
2
(
s2i
)2
+ βs1i s
2
i
]
+δ
∑
j∈Ni(g)
(
s1i s
1
j + s
2
i s
2
j
)
. (9)
The parameter β ∈ (−1, 1) describes the nature of intra-agent strategic interac-
tions, and the parameter δ > 0 ensures that inter-agent strategic interactions are
complements. We extend the model in such a manner that each action has its own
layer of the network as follows:
Πi(s | g) = α1s1i −
1
2
(
s1i
)2
+βs1i s
2
i +α
2s2i −
1
2
(
s2i
)2
+δ1
∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1i s
1
j +δ
2
∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2i s
2
j .
(10)
Let Γ(N,S, g) denote the game on network (N, g) with action set Sn and this pay-
off function. Note that ∂
2Πi(s|g)
∂s1i ∂s
2
i
= β, and so β ∈ (−1, 1) determines the nature of
intra-agent strategic interactions. For β > 0 an agent’s two actions are strategic
complements, and β < 0 implies that an agent’s two actions are strategic substi-
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tutes. Because ∂
2Πi(s|g)
∂spi ∂s
p
j
= δp, strategic interactions on the layer gp are determined
by the parameter δp ∈ (−1, 1), with δp > 0 implying actions on that layer are stra-
tegic complements and δp < 0 describing actions which are strategic substitutes.
In an extension, Chen et al. (2018) describe how their model may be extended to
a multi-layer framework and provide existence results. Our use of this model goes
beyond these results in allowing for strategic substitutes on networks and allowing
for the action set to be bounded, for instance, enforcing that all actions must be
positive.
Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours (2014) demonstrate how this new model
can incorporate their public good model in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007),
and we apply a similar extension to the main model in this paper. Taking
β = 0, then in each layer ∂Πi(s|g)
∂spi
= αp − spi + δps¯pi . Setting marginal payoff
equal to zero, excluding where investment is bound to be positive, implies that
ri(s | g) = max
{
0, αp − δps¯pi
}
. Setting αp = sˆs and δ
p = 1, this is identical to
the best-reply function in our main model when β = 0. Since agents in both
models have identical best-reply functions, they must have identical sets of Nash
equilibria.
To ensure the tractability of this new model, we first establish that Γ(N,S, g)
is a potential game (see Monderer and Shapley 1996). In a potential game, there
exists a potential function φ such that, for all si, s
′
i ∈ S and s−i ∈ Sn−1,
φ(si, s−i)− φ(s′i, s−i) = Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi(s′i, s−i | g). (11)
For a potential game, the set of Nash equilibria is isomorphic to the set of maxima
and saddle points of the potential function.
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Redefining s to be the vector (s11, . . . , sn1, s12, . . . , sn2)
T we propose the follow-
ing.
Proposition 3. The function
φ(s) =
α11
α21

T
s− 1
2
sT
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s (12)
is a potential function for the game Γ(N,S, g).
By determining the parameters under which the potential function is uniquely
concave, we can then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let
υp =

δpλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
(13)
If
(1− υ1) > 0 and (14)
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) (15)
then the game Γ(N,S, g) has a unique equilibrium on the action space S.
This result is consistent with Chen et al. (2018, Theorem 6), which shows that
when δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0, and S = R2, then min{(1− υ1), (1− υ2)} > |β| implies that
there is a unique equilibrium. Our result allows for a more general parameter
space, the ability to restrict the action space, and expands the threshold for which
a unique equilibrium must exist.
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6 Conclusion
Individuals and firms face choices in how to allocate their resources across existing
opportunities. If our neighbour is willing to contribute her own resources towards
our shared benefit, we may invest our own resources elsewhere and exploit our
neighbour’s generosity. Such strategic incentive to exploit neighbours may lead
to outcomes where some people contribute and others free-ride. We explore these
incentives in the context of innovation, where firms have opportunity to invest in
researching two different technologies, and research achievements are shared with
neighbouring firms.
In our model a group of agents is connected by two distinct sets of links,
with each set describing pairs of agents who share benefit from investment in two
different local public goods. Marginal benefit is declining in local investment, so
agents have incentive to reduce investment when neighbours’ investments increase,
and inter-agent investments are strategic substitutes. When an agent invests in
both goods, the cost of each investment increases, and intra-agent investments are
strategic substitutes. We have shown how an increase in an agent’s costs can be
beneficial; when agent i’s return on investment is greater than that of his neighbour
j, because j is investing in the other technology, it may ensure that in equilibrium
i will invest and j will benefit.
Our model provides a framework to analyse how investments in one good affect
investments in the other, and to understand the resulting distribution of payoffs
across the population. From each good, non-investing agents always receive higher
payoff than investors, and payoff is decreasing in the level of investment. However,
because investment in one good reduces the profitability of investment in the other,
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combining two networks and two public goods may have a tendency to balance
payoffs between the two goods and increase equity. As the cost of investing in
both goods increases, the conditions under which a single agent may invest in both
goods cease to exist, and as a result the minimal achievable payoff in equilibrium
increases.
To conclude, we will acknowledge some of our model’s limitations and remark
on potential areas for extension. Agents and public goods are heterogeneous only
in linking structure. A more robust model might include heterogeneous wealth;
and, if wealthier agents have a higher propensity to invest in the public good,
this could overwhelm the strategic effects of investment. While assigning the same
payoff function to each network ensures that the results reflect differences in linking
structure, if each network had a different payoff function we might determine how
different strategic affects cause agents to act. Because inter-agent actions are
strategic substitutes, an agent’s neighbours’ investments push that agent towards
investment in the other network; but, if actions are complements we might see
agents with incentive to pool investments together in one of the networks.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Please note that this proof requires Proposition 1, which is
proved later in this section.
This proof proceeds by induction. First we show that, when there are only
2 agents, in any network structure there is always a Nash equilibrium. For the
inductive step, we select an arbitrary node k in any network and assume that
there is at least one equilibrium in the network g \ k. Assigning the actions from
this equilibrium to the agents in N given the network g, we determine k’s best-
response actions. When k’s actions have no effect on k’s neighbours, then this is an
equilibrium. When k’s actions do effect his neighbours, we show that a cascading
sequence of best responses by all newly affected nodes must be finite, ultimately
ending in an equilibrium.
Base Case: Assume n = 2.
Let N = {i, j}. Then, there are four possible network structures, and we
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may describe each possible set of links using the ordered pair g = (g1ij, g
2
ij).
If g = (0, 0), then the investments si = (sˆd, sˆd) and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are an equi-
librium. If g = (0, 1), then the investments si = (sˆs, 0) and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are
an equilibrium. The case where g = (1, 0) is symmetric to g = (0, 1), and
therefore the investments si = (0, sˆs) and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are an equilibrium.
Finally, if g = (1, 1), then the investments si = (sˆs, 0) and sj = (0, sˆs) are an
equilibrium.
We have demonstrated that a specialised equilibrium exists for all possible
networks with n = 2.
Inductive Step: Assume that for any n ∈ Z, n > 2, a specialised equilibrium ex-
ists ∀ |N | < n. We must show that for any network g with n agents, a
specialised equilibrium exists.
Begin with the network (N, g), with |N | = n, and select any arbitrary agent
k. Construct the reduced network, (N \ k, g), by removing k and any links
connected to k. By our inductive assumption, there is a specialised equilib-
rium profile on the network (N \ k, g). Let this profile be s∗.
Assign the actions in s∗ to the agents in N \ k. Then, N \ k may be par-
titioned into four disjoint sets. Let D denote the set of dual-actors, with
sd = (sˆd, sˆd)∀ d ∈ D. Let I1 denote the set of single-actors investing in layer
g1, with si1 = (sˆs, 0)∀ i1 ∈ I1. Let I2 denote the set of single-actors investing
in layer g2, with si2 = (0, sˆs)∀ i2 ∈ I2. Finally, let L denote the set free-riders,
with s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L.
Next, we will consider all the potential sets of neighbours that k may have
in (N, g), and the actions that k will take assuming all neighbours are taking
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actions s∗. There are four simple cases where k’s actions do not require any
other agents to deviate from s∗, which are described below.
Case 1: ∃ i1 ∈ I1 such that i1 ∈ Nk(g1) and ∃ i2 ∈ I2 such that i2 ∈ Nk(g2)
When k is linked to at least one single-investor in each layer, k’s best
response is to make investment sk = (0, 0). This will not change the
local investment for any agent in N \ k in either layer, and the action
set s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised equilibrium on the network (N, g).
Case 2: ∃ i ∈ I1 ∪D such that i ∈ Nk(g1) and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g2), j ∈ L ∪ I1
In this case, k is linked to at least one investor in layer g1, and k is
only linked to non-investors in g2. k’s best response is to make invest-
ment sk = (0, sˆs). When k does so, the local investment of all of k’s
neighbours in g1 will remain unchanged, and their actions described by
s∗ will remain optimal when links are added to k. When k makes the
investment sk, the local investment of all of k’s neighbours in g
2 will in-
crease. Because all of k’s neighbours in g2 are non-investors in g2 in s∗,
an increase in their local investments will ensure that non-investing re-
mains optimal. Thus, the action set s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised equilibrium
on the network (N, g).
Case 3: ∃ i ∈ I2 ∪D such that i ∈ Nk(g2) and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g1), j ∈ L ∪ I2
This case is symmetric to Case 2 with layers g1 and g2 reversed, and
follows accordingly.
Case 4: ∀ i ∈ Nk(g1), i ∈ L ∪ I2 and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g2), j ∈ L ∪ I1
Here, k is linked only with non-investors in each layer. k therefore
has no local investment in either layer, and k’s optimal investment
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is sk = (sˆd, sˆd). This action will increase the local investment for all
of k’s neighbours in both layers. Because all of k’s neighbours were
non-investors in s∗, after increasing local investment non-investing will
remain optimal. Therefore, the action set s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised equi-
librium on the network (N, g).
If none of Cases 1–4 hold, then it must be true that: after k employs his best
response to all of the agents in N \ k employing strategy s∗, there is at least
on agent in N \ k who will deviate from s∗ in response to k’s action. This
occurs when k is linked to one (or more) dual-actors in a layer, but no single
actors, and k’s local investment in this layer is insufficient to support non-
investment. After an investment by k, these neighbouring dual-actors must
respond by reducing their own investments. This scenario may concurrently
occur in both layers, for instance if k is linked to one dual-actor in each layer.
Without loss of generality, we will proceed by assuming that this occurs in
layer g1 and that when all agents in N \ k employ strategy s∗, s¯1k ≤ s¯2k.
We assume that k makes the investment sk = (sˆs, 0). Then, alter the
strategies employed by all agents according to the following sequence:
1. Assign the strategy s∗ ∪ sk to all agents in N .
2. The only set of agents, excluding k, for whom their currently strategy is
not optimal is the set of dual-actors who are linked to k in layer g1. As-
sume that all of these agents change their action to (0, sˆs), so that they
are now single-actors in layer g2. This will change the subsets of N in
the following way, where the subscript ‘old’ denotes the subsets prior to
this step: I2 = I2old ∪ (Dold ∩Nk(g1)) and D = Dold \ (Dold ∩Nk(g1)).
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3. (a) There may be free-riders who are unconnected to any single-actors
in g1, who now have insufficient local investment to support free-
riding in g1 (because at least one dual-actor to whom they are
linked in g1 became a single-actor in layer g2 in step 2). If any
such free-riders exist, take the set L′ to be a maximal independent
set of these free-riders in g1. Then, assign the action s`′ = (sˆs, 0)
to all agents in L′, which results in the following two new sets:
I1 = I1old ∪ L′ and L = Lold \ L′.
(b) If L′ is non-empty in step 3a, meaning there are agents switching
from the set L to the set I1, then this may cause further agents to
need to change their action. Such agents could only be dual-actors
who were linked to agents in L′ in layer g1, who now find themselves
linked to single-actors. If any such-dual actors exist, let them com-
pose the set D′, and assign them the action sd′ = (0, sˆs), so that
they are now members of I2. The change in sets is I2 = I2old ∪D′
and D = Dold \D′.
(c) If a non-empty set of dual-actors become single-actors in g2 in
step 3b, then this may force additional free-riders who are con-
nected to these agents in layer g1 to begin investing. This mir-
rors the change that occurs in step 3a. If we continue to repeat
steps 3a and 3b, then we will alternate between moving agents from
L to I1 and moving agents from D to I2. Because L is finite, this
sequence of repeated action changes must eventually terminate.
4. After step 2 and repeated applications of steps 3a and 3b the change
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may be summarised: a subset of L have switched to I1 and a subset of
D have switched to I2. The new members of I1 will have no further
effects on other members of the network; they may not have links to
other agents in I1 or else they would not have switched in the first
place. When agents move from D to I2, however, they may affect
additional agents. This would only be previous members of I2 who are
now connected only to non-investors in g1. If there are no such agents,
the current action profile is a specialised equilbrium. Otherwise, let
I2
′
be a maximal independent set of these agents in g1, and assign all
members of I2
′
the new action si2′ = (sˆd, sˆd). We now have the new
sets D = Dold ∪ I2′ and I2 = I2old \ I2′.
5. (a) The change in step 4 will only affect one new set of agents: some
free-riders may no longer have sufficient local investment in g2. If
there are no such free-riders the proof is complete, otherwise let L′
be a maximal independent subset of these free-riders in g2. Change
the action for all of the agents in L to make them single-actors in
g2. The new subsets are I2 = I2old ∪ L′ and L = Lold \ L′.
(b) As in step 3b, step 5a may require dual-actors to switch to single-
action in layer g1.
(c) As in step 3c, steps 5a and 5b must terminate after a finite sequence
of repetitions. At this point, a subset of agents in L will have
switched to I2, and a subset of agents in D will have switched to
I1.
6. After steps 5a–5c, we have a symmetric scenario to that preceding
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step 4. If there are any members of I1 who are no longer linked to
any investors in g2, we move them to D by changing their action to
dual-action. If there are no such agents the current action profile must
be a specialised Nash equilibrium.
7. After step 6, the scenario is symmetric to that preceding steps 5a–5c.
We have either reached a symmetric Nash equilibrium, or a subset of
agents will have to be moved from set L to set I1 and a subset of agents
may have to be moved from set D to set I2.
8. At this point, step 4 repeats. Either we have a specialised equilibrium,
or there are members of set I2 who must be moved to set D.
If a repeated loop of steps 4–7 ever terminates, it must do so in a specialised
Nash equilibrium. Now, note that steps 5a and 7 require that agents be
moved from set L into another set, otherwise the algorithm will terminate.
Because agents are never moved into set L, and set L must be finite to begin
with, this algorithm must eventually terminate.
Therefore, a specialised equilibrium must exist with n+ 1 agents, and the
inductive step is complete.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 summarises a series of lemmas that govern
how an individual agent in an equilibrium must act. The first ensures that any
agent has a unique optimal investment, given the investment decisions of all other
agents.
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Lemma 1. Given the investment decisions of all other agents, s−i, an agent i has
a unique profit maximising investment si.
Proof. The Hessian matrix of Πi(s | g) at si is
H =
f ′′(s1i ) −β
−β f ′′(s2i )
 (16)
By assumption, f ′′(x) < 0 ∀ x ∈ R+, so the first leading principal minor of H
is always negative. The second leading principal minor of H is f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i )− β2.
Assumption 1 tells us that f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i ) > β
2 ∀ si ∈ S˜, which implies that the
second leading principal minor is positive ∀ si ∈ S˜. Because all odd leading prin-
cipal minors are always negative on S˜, and all even leading principal minors are
always positive on S˜. then H is negative definite ∀ si ∈ S˜, which in turn implies
that Πi(s | g) is concave on S˜. By construction, S˜ is compact. A concave function
on a compact set must have a unique maximum.
Next we consider an agent’s actions when it is optimal for an agent to invest
in a single layer.
Lemma 2. In Nash equilibrium, if an agent is a single-actor, then they will always
invest in a layer gp where
p = arg min
x
s¯ix. (17)
Proof. Assume that agent i must be a single-actor, and that i is choosing between
investment in layer g1 or layer g2. Assume that s¯pi ≤ s¯qi . As well, since investment
will not be profitable in gq when s¯qi ≥ sˆs, assume also that s¯qi < sˆs.
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The return that i generates in either layer gm in excess of making no investment
is
f(sˆs)− f(s¯mi )− c(sˆs − s¯mi ). (18)
Then, the difference between an investment in gp and an investment in gq is
f(sˆs)− f
(
s¯pi
)− c (sˆs − s¯pi )− [f(sˆs)− f (s¯qi )− c (sˆs − s¯qi )] (19)
=f
(
s¯qi
)− f (s¯pi )− c (s¯qi − s¯pi ) (20)
Because f ′′(·) < 0 and f ′(sˆs) = c, f ′(x) > c ∀ x ∈ [0, sˆs]. Then, given that
s¯pi ≤ s¯qi < sˆs, it must also follow that f
(
s¯qi
)− f (s¯pi ) > c (s¯qi − s¯pi ) when s¯pi 6= s¯qi ,
which would establish that difference between investing in gp and gq must be posit-
ive. A utility maximising single-actor will, therefore, always invest in a layer with
minimal local effort.
We may determine precisely when investment in a single layer will be optimal
for any agent, and also what investment must be in this scenario.
Lemma 3. Let s∗ be an equilibrium in the network (N, g). Assume that there
exists an agent i for whom s¯pi < s¯
q
i and s¯
p
i < sˆs. Then i is a single-actor making
investment spi
∗ = sˆs − spi in layer gp if and only if
spi
∗ ≥ f
′(s¯qi )− c
β
. (21)
Proof. Let s¯pi ≤ s¯qi , and assume that agent i is investing in only one layer. By
Lemma 2, we know that this must be layer gp. Then i’s investment is si = {spi , 0}.
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Suppose i is making investment spi 6= sˆs − s¯pi in layer gp. Then i’s marginal
payoff in layer gp, is
f ′(spi + s¯
p
i )− c 6= f ′(sˆs − s¯pi + s¯pi )− c (22)
= f ′(sˆs)− c (23)
= 0 (24)
Because i’s marginal payoff in layer gp is not zero, i may improve his payoff by
changing his investment, and i cannot be making an equilibrium investment. Thus,
we may conclude that spi = sˆs − s¯pi .
Now, given spi = sˆs − s¯pi and sqi = 0, i’s marginal payoff from investment in
layer gq is f ′(s¯qi )− β(sˆs − s¯pi )− c. i may only invest zero in layer gq if i’s marginal
payoff is weakly negative, that is
f ′(s¯qi )− β(sˆs − s¯pi )− c ≤ 0 (25)
sˆs − s¯pi ≥
f ′(s¯qi )− c
β
(26)
In the case where local investment for an agent is equal in both layers, then
any investing agent must invest equally in both layers.
Lemma 4. Let s∗ be an equilibrium in the network (N, g). For any agent i whose
local investment is equal in both layers and less than sˆs, that is s¯
1
i = s¯
2
i < sˆs, i must
be making investment si = (s˜i, s˜i), where f
′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
Proof. Because s¯1i = s¯
2
i , Equations (3) and (4) are equivalent, and a solution to
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one is a solution to both. Recall Equation (3):
f ′(s1i + s¯
1
i )− βs1i − c ≤ 0 (27)
Because s¯1i < sˆs,
f ′(0 + s¯1i )− β0− c = f ′
(
s¯1i − c
)
(28)
> f ′(sˆs)− c (29)
> 0, (30)
and because the left side of Equation (27) is continuous and decreasing in s˜i1, there
must be some s˜i > 0 for which f
′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
By the construction of S˜, any solution to Equation (27) may not exceed the
upper boundary of S˜. Then si = (s˜i, s˜i) ∈ S˜ is a solution to Equations (3) and (4).
Lemma 1 ensures that this is the unique solution to agent i’s maximisation prob-
lem.
The following corollary is a direct result of Lemma 4.
Corollary 1. Let s∗ ∈ Sn be an equilibrium of the network (N, g). If there exists
an agent i who has no local investment in either layer, then i must be a dual-
actor making investment s∗i = (sˆd, sˆd), where sˆd is the solution to the equation
f ′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
Proof. From Lemma 4, we have that ∀ x ∈ [0, sˆs), Equations (3) and (4)
have a unique symmetric solution, s∗i = (s˜i, s˜i), if s¯
1
i = s¯
2
i = x. Setting
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s¯1i = s¯
2
i = 0, we find that s
∗
i = (sˆd, sˆd), where sˆd is the solution to the equation
f ′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
Lemmas 1 to 4 and Corollary 1 provide sufficient support for all of the claims
in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The payoff of a dual-actor in a specialist equi-
librium is Πd(s
∗ | g) = 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2. As well, since a free-
rider receives payoff of at least f(sˆs) from each layer, the payoff to
a free-rider must satisfy Π`(s
∗ | g) ≥ 2f(sˆs). Then, Π`(s∗ | g) ≥ 2f(sˆs)
> 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2 = Πd(s∗ | g), and free-riders are always better off than
dual-actors in specialised equilibria.
The payoff that a single-actor receives in the layer in which they are investing
is f(sˆs)− csˆs. In the other layer, a single-actor must be connected to at least one
investing node, otherwise the single-actor would switch to dual-action. Thus, the
payoff to a single-actor must satisfy
Πi(s
∗ | g) ≥ [f(sˆs)− csˆs]+ f(sˆd) (31)
> f(sˆd)− csˆd + f(sˆd) (32)
> 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2 (33)
= Πd(s
∗ | g) (34)
and the payoff of a single-actor must be greater than the payoff of a dual-actor.
Step 32 is based on the fact that sˆs is the optimal investment amount for a single-
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actor, so f(sˆs)− csˆs > f(sˆd)− csˆd, with a strict inequality because f is strictly
concave and thus sˆs is unique.
Thus, all dual-actors will receive payoff less than that of a single-actor or a
free-rider.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we will prove that if N can be partitioned into the
four disjoint sets, L, I1, I2, and D, as defined in Theorem 2, and that the
agents take the action profile s such that: s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L, si1 = (sˆs, 0) ∀ i1 ∈ I1,
si2 = (0, sˆs) ∀ i2 ∈ I2, and sd = (sˆd, sˆd) ∀ d ∈ D, then this is a stable equilibrium.
Let k be the maximum degree of any agent in either g1 or g2.
Note that, because f ′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0, we know that f ′(sˆd)− βsˆs − c < 0.
As well, f ′(0)− βsˆs − c > 0, otherwise single-action could be a local maximum
in autarky, which would violate Lemma 1. Because f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c is
continuous and increasing in x, there must then be some x ∈ (0, sˆd) such that
f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c = 0.
Following similar logic, because f ′(sˆd)− βsˆs − c < 0 and f ′(0)− βsˆs − c > 0,
there is some y ∈ (0, sˆd) such that f ′(y)− βsˆs − c = 0. And finally, let z = sˆd − y.
Let δ =
⌊
sˆs
sˆd
+ 1
⌋
, so δ is the minimum number of dual-actors that a free-
rider who is not connected to any single-actor must be connected to, according to
Item 2a. Assume that
ρ < min
{
sˆd
k
,
δsˆd − sˆs
δk
,
x
k
,
y
k
,
z
k
}
(35)
. Let  be any n× 2 vector such that |pi | < ρ and spi + pi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , p ∈ {1, 2}.
Given a sequence of best responses to starting vector s, let rp,ti (s | g) denote i’s
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investment in layer p in the tth element of the sequence.
Step 1 : Consider r1(s+  | g).
In layer gp, for any ` ∈ L, if condition 2a holds, then ` is connected to at
least δ agents in D. After a permutation of s by , each agent’s investment
may be reduced by at most ρ. Thus, after such a permutation,
s¯p` ≥ δsˆd − kρ (36)
> δsˆd − kδsˆd − sˆs
δk
(37)
> δsˆd − kδsˆd − sˆs
k
(38)
= sˆs. (39)
Agent ` will therefore make no investment in the first step after a permutation
by .
Alternatively, suppose that Item 2b holds, and ` is connected to at least one
agent in Ip and more than one agent in D ∪ Ip. Then after a permutation
of s by , `’s local investment will be such that
s¯p` ≥ sˆs + sˆd − kρ (40)
> sˆs + sˆd − k sˆd
k
(41)
= sˆs. (42)
Again, agent ` will make no investment in the first step after a permutation
by . We may thus conclude that r1` (s+  | g) = (0, 0).
In layer g1, any i2 ∈ I2 is connected to at least one agent in D ∪ I1. After
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a permutation of s by , it is then the case that s¯1i2 ≥ sˆd − kρ. In layer
g2, i2 will have previously had no investment of effort by neighbours, and
thus permutation by  results in s¯2i2 ≤ kρ. This, in turn, implies that i2’s
optimal single-action investment in g2 is weakly greater than sˆs − kρ. Then,
i2’s marginal payoff from investment in g1 would be
∂Πi2(s+  | g)
∂s1i2
≤ f ′(sˆd − kρ)− β(sˆs − kρ)− c (43)
< f ′(sˆd − kx
k
)− β(sˆs − kx
k
)− c (44)
= f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c (45)
= 0 (46)
By Lemma 3, we may then conclude that in the first step after permutation
by , any agent i2 will be a single-actor investing in layer g2, and that i2’s
investment in g2 will be at least sˆs − kρ. That is, r1i2(s+  | g) = (0, s˜i2),
where s˜i2 ∈ [sˆs − k, sˆ] may vary for each member of I2.
By symmetry, we may conclude as well that r1i1(s+  | g) = (s˜i1 , 0), where
s˜i1 ∈ [sˆs − k, sˆ] may vary for each member of I1.
In layer g1, any d ∈ D has no neighbours in D ∪ I1. After a permutation of
s by , we know that s¯pd ∈ [0, kρ]. We wish to consider whether it is possible
for d to switch to single action. Suppose that d were to become a single-actor
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in layer gp. Then,
∂Πd(s+  | g)
∂s1d
≥ f ′(kρ)− βsˆs − c (47)
> f ′(k
y
k
)− βsˆs − c (48)
= f ′(y)− βsˆs − c (49)
= 0. (50)
By Lemma 3, d cannot be a single-actor, and must invest in both layers
after a permutation of s by . If d, reduces investment in layer gp, then
marginal payoff increases in layer gq, which would incentivise d to increase
investment in layer gq. Thus, sˆd − kρ represents the minimal amount that
d could invest in either layer, and we may write that r1d(s+  | g) = (s˜1d, s˜2d),
where s˜1d, s˜
2
d ∈ [sˆd − kρ, sˆd] and both values may vary for each member of D.
We will next consider what investment any agent will make after two steps
of myopic best responses to the permutation .
Step 2 : Consider r2(s+ |g).
In Step 1, we showed that all free-riders, any agent ` ∈ L, will make no in-
vestment, and single-actors will not invest in the layer in which they were not
investing initially. Since dual-actors may only have connections to these two
types of agents, we can conclude that after the first step, s¯pd = 0 ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, we conclude that dual-agents will return to their original investments
in the second step of myopic best responses, that is r2d(s+  | g) = (sˆd, sˆd).
Consider any i1 ∈ I1. In g1, i1 may only be connected to agents in L and I2.
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Since none of these agents will invest in layer g1 in step 1, in step 2 s¯i11 = 0,
and i1’s optimal single-action investment in g1 is sˆs. Now, suppose that i
1
does make this investment. i1 is connected to at least one member of D ∪ I2
in g2, and therefore s¯2i1 ≤ sˆd − kρ. i1’s marginal payoff in g2 is
∂Πi1(sStep1 | g)
∂s2i1
≤ f ′(sˆd − kρ)− βsˆs − c (51)
< f ′(sˆd − k z
k
)− βsˆs − c (52)
= f ′(y)− βsˆs − c (53)
= 0. (54)
Thus, r2i1(s+  | g) = (sˆs, 0) satisfies agent i’s first order conditions, and by
Lemma 1, we may conclude that any agent i1 ∈ I1 will make this investment.
By symmetry, we conclude as well that r2i2(s+  | g) = (0, sˆs).
Finally, consider any agent ` ∈ L. If Item 2b holds, then ` will be connected
to at least one investing single-actor and at least one dual-actor in either
layer gp. Then
s¯p` ≥ (sˆs − kρ) + (sˆd − kρ) (55)
> sˆs − sˆd − 2k sˆd
k
(56)
= sˆs + sˆd (57)
> sˆs. (58)
So ` will not invest in either layer.
Now, consider the case when Item 2a holds, then ` is connected to at least δ
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dual-actors in either layer gp. In this case,
s¯p` ≥ δ(sˆd − kρ) (59)
> δsˆd − δkδsˆd − sˆs
δk
(60)
= sˆs. (61)
Thus, ` will not invest in either layer. We may then conclude that
r2` (s+  | g) = (0, 0).
Thus, we have shown that all agents will return to their original investments
after a permutation of s by  and two steps of myopic best responses.
Now, we will prove the opposite direction, that an equilibrium that is stable
must be characterised as set out in Theorem 2. This requires the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let s, s′ ∈ S be two distinct action profiles such that ∀ i ∈ N s1i ≥ s1i ′,
and s2i ≤ s2i ′. Then, ∀ i ∈ N , r1,2i (s | g) ≥ r1,2i (s′ | g) and r2,2i (s | g) ≤ r2,2i (s′ | g).
As this lemma is a notationally dense, we will state it in words. Given the two
action profiles s, s′ ∈ S, if the actions of all agents in layer g1 are weakly greater in
s than in s′, and the actions of all agents in layer g2 are weakly greater in s′ than
in s, then after two steps of simultaneous myopic best responses by all agents the
same relationships will hold.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let s, s′ ∈ S be two separate action profiles such that ∀ i ∈ N ,
s1i ≥ s1i ′ and s2i ≤ s2i ′.
Pick any arbitrary agent i ∈ N , and suppose that r1i (s) = (sˆs − s¯1i , 0). Then
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we know that f ′(s¯2i )− β(sˆs − s¯1i )− c ≤ 0 by Lemma 3. But then
f ′
(
s¯2i
′)− β (sˆ′s − s¯1i ′)− c ≤ f ′ (s¯2i )− β (sˆs − s¯1i )− c (62)
≤ 0, (63)
so r1i (s
′) =
(
sˆ′s − s¯1i ′, 0
)
, and because s¯1i
′ ≤ s¯1i ′, i’s investment in g1 in r1i (s′) must
be weakly larger than i’s investment in r1i (s), and thus r
1,1
i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and
r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
By a similar argument, it can be shown that if r1i (s
′) =
(
0, sˆs − s¯2i ′
)
, then
it must be the case that r1i (s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ), and so r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and
r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
Because a single-actor will always have a greater marginal payoff function in the
layer of investment than a dual-actor, if r1i (s
′) =
(
sˆ′s − s¯1i ′, 0
)
and r1i (s) involves
dual-investment, or if r1i (s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ) and r1i (s′) involves dual-investment, then
the relationships r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′) must hold.
Suppose that ri(s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ) and ri(s′) = (sˆs − s¯1i ′, 0). Then clearly
r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
We have now shown for all boundary solutions that r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and
r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′), which leaves only the case when both r1i (s) and r1i (s′) involve
dual-investment.
We know that the system
f ′(x¯+ x)− βy − c = 0 and (64)
f ′(y¯ + y)− βx− c = 0 (65)
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is unique, due to Lemma 1. Now we consider what happens to the solution when
x¯ changes and y¯ remains constant. From Equation (65),
f ′′(y¯ + y) dy − β dx = 0 (66)
dy =
β
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx. (67)
Then plug this into the total derivative of Equation (64)
f ′′(x¯+ x)(dx¯+ dx)− β β
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx = 0 (68)
f ′′(x¯+ x)
(
1 +
dx
dx¯
)
− β
2
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx
dx¯
= 0 (69)
dx
dx¯
=
−f ′′(x¯+ x)f ′′(y¯ + y)
f ′′(x¯+ x)f ′′(y¯ + y)− β2 . (70)
Because of Assumption 1, we know that the denominator of Equation (70) is
positive, while the numerator is negative. Thus, we may conclude that, at the
unique solution, dx
dx¯
< 0, which in turn implies that dy
dx¯
> 0, from Equation (67). If
x¯ increases and y¯ decreases, sequential application of this conclusion ensures that
the optimal value of x will decrease and the optimal value of y will increase.
We know that s¯1i ≥ s¯1i ′ and s¯2i ≤ s¯2i ′ ∀ i ∈ N . If both r1i (s) and r1i (s′) involve
dual-investment, then from Equations (67) and (70) we may conclude that
r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′), and we can therefore conclude that these
two relationships always hold.
But then, by applying this fact twice, it must be true that a second step
of best-response function r yields r1,2i (s) ≥ r1,2i (s′) and r2,2i (s) ≤ r2,2i (s′) ∀ i ∈ N ,
which proves this lemma.
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Now, suppose that s∗ ∈ S is a stable equilibrium, and suppose there exists
an investor i such that s¯1i ≤ s¯2i < sˆs, and sˆs − s¯1i < f
′(s¯2i )−c
β
. Proposition 1 tells us
that i will be making an interior investment in both layers. Let i’s investment
be si = (s
1
i , s
2
i ). Because i’s investment is interior, there must be some δ > 0 such
that s˜i = (s
1
i + δ, s
2
i ) ∈ S˜. Now, suppose s∗ is permuted such that i now invests
s˜i and no other agent changes their investment. By Lemma 5, in every second
iteration of the best response function, i’s investment in g1 is greater than s1i + δ.
Therefore, a sequence of best responses to this permutation will not converge to
s∗. Thus, there can be no agent i making an interior investment in both layers.
Now, suppose there exists an investor i such that s¯1i ≤ s¯2i < sˆs, and
sˆs − s¯1i ≥ f
′(s¯2i )−c
β
. Proposition 1 tells us that i will be making an investment
only in layer g1. Let i’s investment be si = (s
1
i , 0), with s
1
i < sˆs. Then, there
must be some δ > 0 such that s1i + δ < sˆs . Now, suppose s
∗ is permuted such
that i now invests makes investment (s1i + δ, 0) and no other agent changes their
investment. By Lemma 5, in every second iteration of the best response function,
i’s investment in g1 is greater than s1i + δ. Therefore, a sequence of best responses
to this permutation will not converge to s∗. Thus, there can be no agent i making
investment si.
We have shown that there may be no interior investors in a stable equilibrium,
leaving only specialists investing (0, 0), (sˆs, 0), (0, sˆs), or (sˆd, sˆd). According to the
criteria established in Proposition 1, such investments will only be best responses
with the agents may be partitioned into the sets L, I1, I2, and D.
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Proof of Proposition 3. I have claimed that the function
φ(s) =
α11
α21

T
s− 1
2
sT
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s (71)
satisfies the properties of a potential function. That is, ∀ si, s′i and ∀ i ∈ N ,
φ(si, s−i)− φ
(
s′i, s−i
)
= Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi
(
s′i, s−i | g
)
. (72)
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Then, ∀ s, s′ ∈ S such that for any i ∈ N , si 6= s′i implies sj = s′j ∀ j 6= i,
φ(si, s−i)− φ
(
s′i, s−i
)
(73)
=φ(s)− φ (s′) (74)
=
α11
α21

T
s− 1
2
sT
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s
−
α11
α21

T
s′ − 1
2
s′T
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s′
(75)
=
∑
j∈N
[
α1s1j + α
2s2j −
1
2
((
s1j
)2
+
(
s2j
)2)
+ βs1js
2
j
]
+
1
2
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
(δ1g1jks
1
js
1
k + δ
2g2jks
2
js
2
k)

−
∑
j∈N
[
α1s1j
′
+ α2s2j
′ − 1
2
((
s1j
′)2
+
(
s2j
′)2)
+ βs1j
′
s2j
′
]
+
1
2
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
(δ1g1jks
1
j
′
s1k
′
+ δ2g2jks
2
j
′
s2k
′
)

(76)
= α1s1i + α
2s2i −
1
2
((
s1i
)2
+
(
s2i
)2)
+ βs1i s
2
i + δ
1s1i
∑
j∈N
g1ijs
1
j + δ
2s2i
∑
j∈N
g2ijs
2
j
−
[
α1s1i
′
+ α2s2i
′ − 1
2
((
s1i
′)2
+
(
s2i
′)2)
+ βs1i
′
s2i
′
+ δ1s1i
′∑
j∈N
g1ijs
1
j
′
+ δ2s2i
′∑
j∈N
g2ijs
2
j
′

(77)
=Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi
(
s′i, s−i | g
)
(78)
Thus, φ satisfies the properties of a potential function.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Let
υp =

δpλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
(79)
If
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2), (80)
then the game Γ(N,S, g) has a unique equilibrium on the action space S.
From Proposition 3, we know that the potential function for the game Γ(N,S, g)
is
φ(s) =
α11
α21

T
s− 1
2
sT
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s. (81)
Then,
∂φ(s)
∂s
=
α11
α21
−
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

 s (82)
and
∇φ(s) = −
I −
δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2

. (83)
To prove that φ(s) has a unique global maximum on S, it is sufficient to show that
−∇φ(s) is positive definite on S. First, let
M = −∇φ(s) =
I − δ1G1 −βI
−βI I − δ2G2
 . (84)
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M is positive definite if and only if its upper left block and the Schur com-
plement if its upper left block are positive definite. These are (I − δ1G1) and
(I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1 respectively.
Recall that
υp =

δpλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
. (85)
Thus, −υ1 is the minimum eigenvalue of −δ1G1, which requires the fact that the
minimum eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix is less than or equal to 0. It follows,
then, that 1− υ1 is the minimum eigenvalue of (I − δ1G1). We may thus conclude
that (I − δ1G1) is positive definite if and only if 1− υ1 > 0.
Consider now the Schur complement, (I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1. By Weyl’s
inequality
λmin
[
(I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1] (86)
≥λmin(I − δ2G2) + λmin(−β2(I − δ1G1)−1) (87)
=(1− υ2)− β
2
1− υ1 . (88)
Now, we have assumed
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) (89)
⇐⇒ (1− υ2)− β
2
1− υ1 > 0, (90)
which is sufficient to show that the minimum eigenvalue of the Schur complement
is greater than zero, and thus the Schur complement is positive definite.
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Thus, the assumptions that 1− υ1 > 0 and β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) are sufficient
to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium.
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